Hashdays 2012 Android Challenge
Axelle Apvrille, Fortinet
November 2-3, 2012

Abstract
This is the solution to the Android challenge released at Hashdays 2012 [has12], in Lucerne, Switzerland, November 2-3 2012.
If you are willing to try the challenge, stop reading this document as it spoils it all!

1 Challenge
The challenge consists in a single APK file, with no particular additional explanation.

-rw-r--r-- 1 axelle axelle 46627 Sep 21 12:00 hashdays-challenge.apk

If you want to check your version:
sha1 : 0b12fd28a2d912762d37379e69189cd427eb8bbc
sha256: 8acfac2d1646b7689e09aab629a58ba66029b295068ca76cdaccbdc92b4e5ea9

2 First glance
The .apk extension is for Android Packages, and it looks like this package is indeed an Android package: it uses the ZIP format and note the presence of the typical classes.dex (Dalvik Executable) file.

$ file hashdays-challenge.apk
hashdays-challenge.apk: Zip archive data, at least v2.0 to extract

$ unzip -l hashdays-challenge.apk
Archive: hashdays-challenge.apk

Length Date Time Name
--------- ---------- ----- ----
651 2012-09-21 11:01 META-INF/MANIFEST.MF
772 2012-09-21 11:01 META-INF/FORTIGUA.SF
1373 2012-09-21 11:01 META-INF/FORTIGUA.RSA
1352 2012-09-21 10:16 AndroidManifest.xml
1920 2012-09-21 10:12 resources.arsc
14984 2012-09-21 11:01 classes.dex
27232 2012-09-18 16:18 assets/blob.bin
2930 2012-09-11 17:43 res/drawable-hdpi/logo.png
1846 2012-09-11 17:43 res/drawable-ldpi/logo.png
2003 2012-09-11 17:43 res/drawable-mdpi/logo.png
1120 2012-09-21 10:16 res/layout/main.xml

--------- -------
56183 11 files

Let’s run it in an Android Emulator (Figures 1 and 2):
$ ./adb install /tmp/hashdays-challenge.apk
2499 KB/s (46627 bytes in 0.018s)
    pkg: /data/local/tmp/hashdays-challenge.apk
Success

Figure 1: A new challenge application is installed on the device

Figure 2: Find the password for fame, fun and no profit :)

So, as usual, this is all about finding the right password.

3 Reverse engineering

3.1 Disassembling

We decompile the challenge with apktool [apk].

$ java -jar apktool.jar d hashdays-challenge.apk ./apktool-output
I: Baksmaling...
I: Loading resource table...
I: Loaded.
I: Loading resource table from file: /home/axelle/apktool/framework/1.apk
I: Loaded.
I: Decoding file-resources...
I: Decoding values/* XMLs...
I: Done.
I: Copying assets and libs...

The reversed code is in ./apktool-output/smali. If we are more familiar with Java code, we could use dex2jar [Dexb].

2
3.2 Android Manifest

The AndroidManifest is extremely simple with a single activity, named PuzzleActivity, which is started when the application is launched.

```xml
<manifest version="1.0" encoding="utf-8">
  <package name="com.fortiguard.challenge.hashdays2012.challengeapp">
    <application>
      <activity android:name="PuzzleActivity">
        <intent-filter>
          <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
          <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
        </intent-filter>
      </activity>
    </application>
  </manifest>
```

3.3 Nothing to see :(  

PuzzleActivity is a very simple activity that displays a screen like Figure 2. When we press the Validate button, this triggers the checkSecret method of Validate:

```java
invoke-static {v1}, Lcom/fortiguard/challenge/hashdays2012/challengeapp/Validate;->checkSecret(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/String;
```

If you don’t enjoy smali more than that jump to 3.3.2

3.3.1 The Validate class, in smali

The Validate class starts with the definition of a few static fields. The static array `hashes` is filled with hexadecimal strings:

```smali
const-string v1, "d09e1fe7c97238c68e4be7b3cd...
aput-object v1, v0, v5
const-string v1, "4813494d137e1631bba301d5...
aput-object v1, v0, v6
sput-object v0, Lcom/fortiguard/challenge/hashdays2012/challengeapp/Validate;->hashes:[Ljava/lang/String;
```

Another static array, `answers`, is filled with messages:

```
Congrats from the FortiGuard team :) 
Nice try, but that would be too easy 
Ha! Ha! FortiGuard grin ;) 
Are you implying we are n00bs? 
Come on, this is a DEFCON conference!
```

If we have tried a few random passwords in the challenge application, we know those messages are what the application displays (see Figure 3). We probably need to get this: "Congrats from the FortiGuard team :)".

After this, a big array of continuous values (00, 01, 02... FF) are written to the String array `hexArray`. We guess this is probably for hex to string conversion. Strange, the array is not used. Perhaps a remnant of debugging.

```bash
$ grep -r hexArray ./smali 
```

3
Then a multi-dimension array named `bh` is allocated, and a boolean field named `computed` is initialized to false.

The constructor does not do anything interesting apart copying the Context object, which is pretty common in Android apps.

Now, we want to dig into the `checkSecret()` method. This method takes as input parameter the password we entered, and it returns a string among `answers`. How? well obviously, it computes a sha-256 hash of the password, and checks if it matches a given value.

This part computes the hash:

```java
1 // the result is stored in a variable named computedHash
2 .local v0, computedHash:[B
3 ...
4 // initialize int i = 0
5 const/4 v3, 0x0
6 .local v3, i:I
7 ...
8 // compare with bh[i]
9 sget-object v4, Lcom/fortiguard/challenge/hashdays2012/challengeapp/Validate;->bh:[[B
10 aget-object v4, v4, v3
11 invoke-static {v0, v4}, Ljava/util/Arrays;->equals([B[B)Z
12 move-result v4
```

What do we have in array `bh`? Actually, `bh` is filled by method `convert2bytes()`. The array hashes contains hashes as a hexadecimal string. Convert2bytes() writes each hash as a byte array into an entry of `bh`.

If we come back to `checkSecret()`, it checks the input’s hash against a fixed set of hashes. Depending on the hash that matches, it outputs a given message from the `answer` array:

```java
sget-object v4, Lcom/fortiguard/challenge/hashdays2012/challengeapp/Validate;->answers:[Ljava/lang/String;
```

and if nothing matches, it returns a default string (the fourth):

```java
sget-object v4, Lcom/fortiguard/challenge/hashdays2012/challengeapp/Validate;->answers:[Ljava/lang/String;
```

That’s all. And after that, we have the `convert2bytes()` method that we already detailed, a `hexStringToByteArray()` method which obviously convert a hex string to a byte [] and a `isEmulator()` method which is particularly short:
3.3.2 The Validate class, in Java

With dex2jar, you can read decompiled code for the Validate class. Below, we will only insist on the checkSecret() method:

- it hashes the input with SHA-256
- checks the result against fixed values stored in the bh array
- depending on the match, it returns a given message in the answer array. If no hash match, it returns answer[4].

```java
public static String checkSecret(String paramString)
{
    try{
        MessageDigest localMessageDigest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
        localMessageDigest.reset();
        byte[] arrayOfByte = localMessageDigest.digest(paramString.getBytes());
        if (!computed)
        {
            convert2bytes();
            break label114;
            while (i < hashes.length)
            {
                if (Arrays.equals(arrayOfByte, bh[i]))
                {
                    str = answers[i];
                    return str;
                }
                i++;
            }
        }
    }
    catch (Exception localException)
    {
        while (true)
        {
            Log.w("Hashdays", "checkSecret: " + localException.toString());
            String str = answers[4];
            continue;
            label114: int i = 0;
        }
    }
}
```
3.4 Intermediate conclusion

So it seems that the application validates the input by hashing it with SHA-256 and checking the result against fixed values. The winner hash, which displays “Congrats from the FortiGuard team :)”, is

\[622a751d6d12b46ad74049cf50f2578b871ca9e9447a98b06c21a44604cab0b4.\]

Of course, it is worth trying a few passwords, but you’d need to be very lucky. And until the SHA-3 competition is finished, SHA-256 is one of the most secure hashes... so good luck :(

We however notice a few strange things:

- the static array `hexArray` is not used. The context provided to the Validate constructor is not used either.
- the method `isEmulator()` is useless
- there is an asset named `blob.bin` in the package (see 2).

Let’s have a look at this asset:

```
$ file blob.bin
blob.bin: data
$ hexdump -C blob.bin | head -n 3
00000000  52 e8 1d 23 fa 3d f4 d9 61 55 9c db e5 13 c6 e4  |R..#.=..aU......|
00000010  91 36 24 9c 1a be 14 15 7e 8a 7d 01 09 b1 a9 78  |.6$.....˜.}....x|
00000020  03 2c b5 19 59 7f b5 81 59 ee b6 47 58 93 7e 6a  |.,..Y...Y..GX.˜j|
```

Really, we can’t make any sense about this.

There is nothing either in the resource directory, apart our nice icon.

So what?! Well, actually, I designed the challenge, so I know the solution, I just merely hope at some point you wondered what this was all about ;)

Let’s list the strings in the challenge’s classes.dex:

```
$ strings classes.dex
!D5C1
@301c4cd0097640bdbe766b55924c0d5c5cc28b9f2bda5b10e4eb7c442ca0c66
@4813494d137e1631bbab30ld5acab6e7bb7aa74ce1185d456565ef5d737677b2
AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding
```

AES? Wait! We did not see anybody using AES in our code?

```
$ grep -r AES ./smali
```

Let’s continue with the strings:

```
Are you implying we are n00bs?
Bad SHA-256 for
```

We did not see “Bad SHA-256 for” either... If we parse the strings more there a couple more we never saw: cutlen, doFinal, getAssets, getExternalStorageDirectory, mixed, skeySpec, whatever, work.

**Something is hidden is the DEX file!**
4 Hide and Seek in the DEX file

There are probably plenty of other ways to do it, but 010 Editor [010] with a template for DEX files [Lar] is extremely handy for the investigation.

We get the classes.dex from the package, load it in 010 Editor and run the DEX template on it. In the array of method_ids, we notice a method we had never seen: Validate.work() - see Figure 4.

![Figure 4: Our smali code hadn’t mentioned Validate.work()!](image)

It is also possible to spot the hidden method with Androlyze [Des]:

In [1]: d, dx = AnalyzeDex('classes.dex')

In [2]: d.methods.show()

34########## Method Id Item
class_idx=25 proto_idx=20 name_idx=467
class_idx_value=Lcom/fortiguard/challenge/hashdays2012/challengeapp/Validate;
proto_idx_value=[‘()’, ‘V’] name_idx_value=work

In the class_def of Validate, we however do not see that work() method - see Figure 4.

![Figure 5: Validate.work() is not listed in the class definition](image)

Additionally, there is a strange empty spot after the last method declaration in the Validate class - see Figure 6. The structure encoded_method for isEmulator() ends at 0x39b0, but the dex_map_list only starts at 0x39b8.
This is just enough for the declaration of a hidden method. To summarize: we’ve got unused fields (hexArray), unused strings (Bad SHA-256, AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding...), a method work() which is listed in the method list, but not in the corresponding class, an empty spot at the end of the method declaration of the Validate class, after isEmulator. Looks like the declaration for the method work() has been erased from the DEX file!

4.1 Easy way with IDA Pro

If you have IDA Pro, the easiest path to the solution is now to launch IDA Pro and look at the end of isEmulator(). What if the bytes afterward were code? (see Figure 7).

Press button P to define a function at 0x1fcc and enjoy the magic at Figure 8.

4.2 Revealing the code of the hidden method with Androguard

A slightly more difficult approach relies on the use of Androguard [Des].

As we have seen previously, our guess is that there is a hidden method after isEmulator(). Figure 9 shows isEmulator’s code offset starts at 0x1FB8 and finishes at 0x1FCB.

So, with Androlyze, we are going to inspect isEmulator() and changes its code offset to the supposed location of the hidden method. Let’s try just after 0x1FCB, i.e at 0x1FCC = 8140.

To do so, we need to patch androlyze and add a set_code_off function that specifies a new code offset.
diff -r af174939fcc1 androguard/core/bytecodes/dvm.py
--- a/androguard/core/bytecodes/dvm.py Fri Sep 14 11:11:48 2012 +0200
+++ b/androguard/core/bytecodes/dvm.py Tue Sep 25 16:34:58 2012 +0200
@@ -2684,6 +2684,10 @@
     return self.code_off
 
+def set_code_off(self, off):
+    self.code_off = off
+    self.reload()

def get_access_flags_string(self):
    ""
    Return the access flags string of the method
    ""

Then, we use Androlyze:

In [1]: d, dx = AnalyzeDex( 'classes.dex' )

In [2]: isemulator = d.CLASS_Lcom_fortiguard_challenge_hashdays2012_challengapp_Challengeapp.Validate.METHOD_isEmulator

In [3]: isemulator.set_code_off(8140)

In [4]: isemulator.get_code_off()
Out[4]: 8140

In [5]: isemulator.pretty_show()

The hidden method is displayed by pretty_show() at Figure 10.

Another way to do this without even patching Androguard is to display all the code:

In [1]: d = DalvikVMFormat( open('classes.dex').read())

In [2]: codes = d.get_codes_item()

In [3]: codes.show()
This will display the disassembly for the all code items in the data section. To specifically show the hidden function:

In [1]: d = DalvikVMFormat( open('classes.dex').read())

In [2]: d.codes.get_code(0x1fcc).show()

4.3 Re-constructing the method declaration

There is yet another way to solve this stage, perhaps the cleanest solution. It consists in re-constructing the missing entry for `Validate.work()`.

A method declaration consists in:

- a method_idx_diff. [DEXa] defines this as "index into the method_ids list for the identity of this method (includes the name and descriptor), represented as a difference from the index of previous element in the list. The index of the first element in a list is represented directly".

- an access flag. Typically ACC_PUBLIC = 0x1 for public access.

- offset to the code

We want to re-construct the entry for method `Validate.work()`, just after the declaration of `Validate.isEmulator()`. After direct methods, the DEX format specifies virtual methods. So, let’s declare `work()` as a virtual method. Its method_idx_diff will be `34 = 0x22` (see Figure 4). Its access flag will be ACC_PUBLIC = 0x1. Figure 9 shows `isEmulator()`’s code offset starts at 0x1FB8 and finishes at 0x1FCB. So, we can try and set work’s code offset to 0x1FCC.

We can use any hexadecimal editor to modify the DEX file at 0x39b1 and write the new entry. Beware, we are writing ulib128 [DEXa], so "each byte has its most significant bit set except for the final byte in the sequence, which has its most significant bit clear". This means we actually write: 0x22 0x01 0x3f 0x3f.

Then, we also need to edit the number of virtual methods of the class (address 0x3981) and set it to 1. Finally, we need to re-compute the SHA1 and the checksum of the file.

The checksum is an Adler checksum. It is computed on all fields except magic and itself.
sub compute_dex_checksum {
    my $filename = shift;
    open( FILE, $filename ) or die "sha1: cant open $filename: $!";
    binmode FILE;

    # skip magic and checksum
    get_magic(\*FILE);
    $dex->{checksum} = get_checksum(\*FILE);

    my $a32 = Digest::Adler32->new;
    $a32->addfile(\*FILE);
    close(FILE);

    my $checksum = $a32->hexdigest;
    return $checksum;
}

The SHA-1 hash of the file is computed on the entire file except magic, checksum and itself.
Then, we can decompile the new DEX and, for instance, obtain the following code:

```perl
sub compute_dex_sha1 {
    my $filename = shift;
    open( FILE, $filename ) or die "sha1: cant open $filename: $!";
    binmode FILE;

    $dex->{magic} = get_magic(
        FILE );
    $dex->{checksum} = get_checksum( FILE );
    $dex->{sha1} = get_sha1( FILE );

    my $shaobj = new Digest::SHA("1");
    my $sha1 = $shaobj->addfile( FILE )->hexdigest;
    close( FILE );
    return $sha1;
}
```

Figure 10: A patched Androlyze reveals the hidden method
public void work()
{
    AssetManager localAssetManager = this.context.getAssets();
    byte[] arrayOfByte1 = new byte[1024];
    byte[] arrayOfByte2 = hexStringToByteArray("E6A7C9A6C6A5CCE9CEADC958F405CCBF...");
    int i = arrayOfByte2.length / 2;
    byte[] arrayOfByte3 = new byte[i];
    byte[] arrayOfByte4 = new byte[i];
    int j = 0;
    for (int k = 0; ; k++)
    {
        int m = -1 + arrayOfByte2.length;
        if (j >= m)
        {
            break;
        } else
        {
            arrayOfByte3[k] = (byte)(0xA7 ^ arrayOfByte2[j]);
            arrayOfByte4[k] = (byte)(0xA7 ^ arrayOfByte2[(j + 1)]);
            j += 2;
        }
    }
    InputStream localInputStream;
    FileOutputStream localFileOutputStream;
    Cipher localCipher;
    try
    {
        localInputStream = localAssetManager.open("blob.bin");
        File localFile = new File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory()
            + File.separator + "whatever");
        localFileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(localFile);
        SecretKeySpec localSecretKeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(arrayOfByte3, "AES");
        IvParameterSpec localIvParameterSpec = new IvParameterSpec(arrayOfByte4);
        localCipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
        localCipher.init(2, localSecretKeySpec, localIvParameterSpec);
        MessageDigest localMessageDigest = MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256");
        for (int n = localInputStream.read(arrayOfByte1); n != -1;
            n = localInputStream.read(arrayOfByte1))
        {
            byte[] arrayOfByte7 = localCipher.update(arrayOfByte1, 0, n);
            localMessageDigest.update(arrayOfByte1, 0, n);
            if (arrayOfByte7 == null)
            {
                continue;
            }
            localFileOutputStream.write(arrayOfByte7);
            localFileOutputStream.flush();
        }
    }
byte[] arrayOfByte5 = localMessageDigest.digest();
StringBuffer localStringBuffer = new StringBuffer();
for (int i1 = 0; ; i1++)
{
    int i2 = arrayOfByte5.length;
    if (i1 >= i2) break;
    localStringBuffer.append(hexArray[(0xFF & arrayOfByte5[i1])]);
}
if (localStringBuffer.toString().compareToIgnoreCase("528f83083b5df4fee..."))
{
    throw new IOException("Bad SHA-256 for " + "blob.bin");
}
catch (Exception localException)
{
    Log.e("Hashdays", localException.toString());
}
while (true)
{
    return;
    byte[] arrayOfByte6 = localCipher.doFinal();
    if (arrayOfByte6 != null)
    {
        localFileOutputStream.write(arrayOfByte6);
        localFileOutputStream.flush();
    }
    localFileOutputStream.close();
    localInputStream.close();
}

5 Reversing the hidden method

The code shows that:

- we load a fixed hexadecimal string E6A7C... and make 2 byte arrays out of it. Bytes are read 2 by 2: the first byte goes in the first array, the second to the second array. Each byte is XORed with 0xa7.
- we open the asset we had noticed, blob.bin, and are going to decrypt it in a file named whatever. The encryption algorithm is AES-CBC using PKCS5 padding. The first array of byte above is the key and the second is the initialization vector.
- we also perform a SHA-256 hash of blob.bin, and convert the resulting byte array to a hexadecimal string using hexArray. We compare the string to a fixed hash 528f8... If the hash does not match, we display "Bad SHA-256 for blob.bin".

We now need to decrypt blob.bin. There are two solutions: modify the challenge’s application to add a call to work() and hence decrypt blob.bin, or write our own standalone code that decrypts blob.bin. The code is not difficult to write:
public static void likeAndroid() throws Exception {
    String mixed = "E6A7C9A6C6A5CCE9CEADC958F40..";
    InputStream is = new FileInputStream("blob.bin");
    OutputStream os = new FileOutputStream("decrypted-out");

    // decode keys
    byte[] all = DecryptBlob.hexStringToByteArray(mixed);
    int cutlen = all.length / 2;
    byte[] key = new byte[cutlen];
    byte[] iv = new byte[cutlen];

    for (int i=0, j=0; i<all.length-1; i+=2, j++) {
        key[j]=(byte)(all[i] ^ 0xa7);
        iv[j]=(byte)(all[i+1] ^ 0xa7);
    }

    // decrypt file
    SecretKeySpec skeySpec = new SecretKeySpec(key, "AES");
    IvParameterSpec ivspec = new IvParameterSpec(iv);
    Cipher cipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding");
    cipher.init(Cipher.DECRYPT_MODE, skeySpec, ivspec);

    byte[] b = new byte[1024];
    while (bytesRead != -1) {
        byte[] c = cipher.update(b, 0, bytesRead);
        if (c != null) {
            os.write(c);
            os.flush();
        }
        bytesRead = is.read(b);
    }

    byte[] end = cipher.doFinal();
    if (end != null) {
        os.write(end);
        os.flush();
    }
    os.close();
    is.close();
}

Now, we can read the decrypted blob.bin.

$ hexdump -C blob.bin | head
00000000  20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20  | | | | | | | | | | |
0000000a  20 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e |
00000012  2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e 2e |

This is a bit strange. Not immediately readable. But if we do:

$ file blob.bin
blob.bin: ASCII text

It clearly states this is ASCII. So let’s load it in a browser: it’s ASCII art - Figure 5.

We go back to the challenge application and enter MayTheF0rceB3W1thU and get the congrats - Figure 12
6 Bonus

The AES key is AnakinSkywalker.

To get the message "Nice try, but that would be too easy", use AnakinSkywalker as password.

To get the message "Ha! Ha! FortiGuard grin ;)", use Fortiguard as password.

To get the message "Are you implying we are n00bs?". use root as password.

References


Figure 12: Congratulations for solving the challenge